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1.  INTRODUCTION
The representatives  and advocates  of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of
the European  Community (EC), a major exporter  of food  and agricultural commodities,
claim that (a) food security  has already been achieved  domestically  for a long time as an
unambiguous result of a well-defined  and successful  agricultural  policy design, and that
(b)  their countries even provide abundant food  for needy regions in the developing
world, thus alleviating food insecurity abroad.  Looking  at the tremendous  production,
export,  and stock volumes in  these countries this  statement seems to be supported  at a
first glance.  In this paper it is argued  that EC's agricultural  policy has, in fact:
- contributed little if at all to domestic food security and is obviously  not able
to avoid  newly arising poverty and hunger for some minorities;
aggravated  the  efforts of providing people with enough food at reasonable
prices in the developing world.
Before starting the discussion  on these hypotheses in Sections  3 and 4, it is
worthwhile to give a precise definition of what is meant by  food security,  to develop  an
indicator with which one  can measure food security,  and finally to derive  a conceptual
framework  for evaluating  different degrees  of food  security (Section  2).  All  three aspects
will be discussed and  analyzed  as general  as possible  in order to make  the food security
approach applicable for rural and urban poor in both  developing  (LDCs) and  developed
countries  (DCs).  The paper does neither provide  any quantitative  estimations of food
1security levels, nor does it discuss policy options for coping with the food security issue.
Rather, it attempts to improve the theoretical  foundation,  to develop  some alternative
indicators,  and to apply both to the mentioned  hypotheses.  More specifically,  some more
recent developments  in the field of applied welfare  economics  are introduced  which,  in
the author's  view, have been under-utilized  in food  security research.  This kind of
analysis  might  especially be useful for comparisons  of food  security levels between
households,  regions,  and countries  as well as for giving  a basis on which  national  and
supranational funds can be allocated  to the poor.
2.  DEFINITION.  MEASUREMENT.  AND  EVALUATION
"Food security is access by all people  at all times to  enough food for an active  and
healthy life"  (World Bank,  1986).  This definition which seems to reach  the highest rate
of acceptance  among concerned  researchers  implies that (see Phillips and Taylor,  1990,
p. 1304):
- food  is available,  accessible,  affordable  -- when and where  needed  -- in
sufficient quantity and quality;
an assurance  is given  this state of affairs  to be reasonably  expected  to
continue.
Moreover,  this widely accepted  definition reflects  the shifts from
- a production  orientation to a consumption  and health focus;
- country-level  to household-  or individual-level  analysis;
- a solely quantity point  of view to both quantity and quality issues;
- static or cross-section  analysis to dynamic analysis  over time;
2- merely transitory to transitory and chronic malnutrition.
It has been noted that national  food security  does not imply household or individual  food
security (Staatz,  D'Agostino and Sundberg,  1990, pp.  1312-1316) and that food security
today does not imply food security  tomorrow.  The most important result from previous
research,  however, has been the observation  that not an inadequate level  of food supply
causes hunger but a lack of individual  purchasing  power or real income  (see also
Chisholm and Tyers,  1982, p. 5).  Hence, individual  poverty  is the driving force behind
hunger  and malnutrition.  This makes  clear, why food insecurity  is not restricted  to poor
countries.  Even in rich countries a small but growing group of the  population do not
have access to sufficient food  (Allen and Thompson,  1990, pp. 1162-1163;  Phillips and
Taylor,  1990, p.  1304) because their real income falls below the poverty threshold.
With this causal relationship in mind, the question  arises under which
preconditions  individual real income  or real household  income  could be an adequate
basis for the measurement  of food security.  Obviously, a minimum of that income  is
required to meet individual's needs.  A minimum level  of real income  can also be
interpreted  as a minimum right to resources  in the  sense  of Atkinson  (1991,  p.  8) which
enables individuals  to participate  in a particular  society,  as  a guarantee  of "positive
freedom."  As  a rule of thumb the poverty  or the food  security line  in developed
countries  is estimated to be that disposable household  income  which is less than 40 to  50
percent of the national  average,  thus implying  a relative  measure.  In Developing
Countries it would make  more sense,  however,  to define  a fixed amount of real
purchasing power which enables  individuals to have access to enough  and  healthy food.
3When calculating  this real purchasing power it has  to be kept in mind  that income
in-kind  has to be added  (i.e., home produced goods and services)  and a discount for  non-
available  or rationed food  should be subtracted.  But even when these problems are
solved three additional  aspects warrant further  attention:  the relevant time period
considered,  the choice of equivalence  scale in case of different  household  sizes,  and how
food intake corresponds to income.  Whereas  the measurement  of poverty  is generally
based on cross-section  analysis per year  (Atkinson,  1991,  pp. 5-17), the  proposal here is
to use time series  analysis of real household  income  in order to capture  seasonal
variability and life  cycle variations including complete breakdowns  of income  (see also
Ravallion and Huppi,  1991,  pp. 57-82).  The  choice  of the  time unit (daily,  weekly,
monthly,  annually)  should depend  on whether different  options of dissaving,  borrowing  or
participating in income  streams of related people  are  available.  If there aren't  any risk
sharing private  or official  institutions,  then a daily-based income  report would be the
best.  Depending  on the size of the household,  the  age structure  of its members,  the
distribution between male  and female,  the degree  of handicaps  of people, and their
nutritional and health  status, the required  minimum household  income (food security
line)  differs widely.  Buhmann and others  (1988,  pp.  115-142)  therefore  propose an
adjusted income indicator  (Yadj)  to make food security or poverty  levels  of households
comparable  and to take into  account the above mentioned  aspects:
yadj  =  total real household  income  /  nS
where n denotes the number of members  of the household  and s is the elasticity of
family need with respect to family size.  The equivalence  scales are based on subjective
4evaluation and in the poverty literature  this ranges  from 0.25  to 0.72  (Atkinson,  1991,  p.
15).  Finally, what can be said about the correlation of real  income with food intake  and
the nutritional  and healthy status of individuals?  Fortunately,  recent  contributions in the
literature show a strong positive relationship between  income and  nutrition implying  that
nutrition and health are  improving with  income growth  (Schiff and Vald6s,  1990, p.  1320;
Von Braun,  1990, p.  1323).  Faced with a lack of data concerning the determinants  of the
nutrition and health production functions, the real household  income might therefore
provide  an acceptable  basis for the  measurement of food security (an example  of how  to
calculate  this real income indicator for Sub-Saharan Africa  is given in Sahn and Sarris,
1991, p. 262).
So far only the level  aspect of food security  has been addressed.  The level of real
household income  should not fall below a certain  target or minimum level.  However,
food insecurity reflects the adverse effects  of an uncertain  world as  well.  Hence,  we
should  also look at the fluctuations  of real household  income  around its mean trend.
Formally,  this is the probability distribution of real income over time that matters and  it
should be the objective  of any food  security policy to keep the probability  of real income
falling below the target level  as low as possible at reasonable  opportunity  costs.  Then
one can measure  food insecurity  as the probability (a) of real  income falling below the
critical  level y* (see  Figure  1 for  illustration).  The food security level  (FS)  is then:
y  - E[y]  ]
(1)  FS  =  1 - Prob  F(y)  <  or 1 - a in  Figure  1 I  (var  [y]) °-
where
5Prob  probability
E  expectation operator
var  variance
Y =  Yadj  adjusted real income
y*  minimum income
F(y)  standard normalized  cumulative distribution  function
For practical  purposes the first (mean) and second (variance)  moments of the probability
distribution can be used to calculate the  degree of food insecurity which ranges  from




y'  Real  Income  over  Time  (y)
(Minimum  Level)  on  a Daily  Basis
Figure 1.  Measurement of Food  Insecurity
6So far we have only addressed  the positive questions of measurement.  Nothing has
been said on the evaluation  of different probability distributions  in welfare terms  or how
food security does correspond  to individual welfare measures.  Normatively speaking,  i.e.,
does the individual prefer the probability distribution B  over A (Figure  1) although food
insecurity  increases (a  plus shaded area)?  The answer to this question depends  on the
weights the individual gives  to mean, variance,  skewness,  and other moments  in his/her
preference  function.  Hence, an economic agent would prefer B over A if and only if the
level  increasing benefit outweighs the risk loss neglecting  higher moments.  The most
common practice  of economic analysis  in such cases  has become to apply the expected
utility approach  or the stochastic dominance  approach  (see Dillon and Anderson,  1990,
pp.  120-157).  In the following we'll use  the former  assuming a normal distribution of
real income which  leads to a simple mean-variance  formula of expected  utility of income
(Newbery  and Stiglitz,  1981,  p. 85):
(2)  E [U  (y)]  =  E [y]  - h  A  var [y]
A  coefficient of absolute risk aversion
U  utility
This equation is especially  useful as a complementary  tool for evaluation of food security
because it
--  contains both mean and variance  of income  as arguments,  thus considering  the
stochastic nature of the problem;
7--  can be applied  to producers, consumers, and other agents such as taxpayers
and politicians;
--  contains  the risk attitudes  of market agents;
--  allows comparisons  over time  and among agents  of situations with a different
extent of food insecurity;
--  provides a reasonable  money measure of food security  costs and benefits.
We are now in a position to define, to measure,  and to assess food  security  or food
insecurity, respectively.  Hence,  the question  can be  answered:  What is the contribution
of the CAP to domestic food security?
3.  COMMON AGRICULTURAL  POLICY  AND DOMESTIC FOOD  SECURITY
Agricultural  Price Policy in the EC implies  an average  increase of producer prices
over their free market levels,  a considerable  stabilization  of prices compared  to the
world market (see Table  1),  and finally a distortion of the price pattern in favor of
grains,  milk, beef,  and sugar beets.  These market interventions  will be evaluated  from a
producer's and consumer's point of view.
3.1  Producer's  Welfare  and Food Security
The impact  of this price policy on producer's  welfare can be measured by the
expected  utility of an indirect profit function  (see  Just, Hueth  and Schmitz,  1982, p.  349):
(3)  E [U  (r)]  =  E [U  (ir  {p, v, K})]
8Table 1.  Variabilitya of German Food Import Prices -- 1970-1985
Price Variability  (%)
Imports  from  Imports from
Products  EC-Member  Countries  Third  Countries
Aggregates
Grains and Cereal Products  5.6  17.9
Milk and Dairy Products  3.4  65
Swine and Pork  9.5  7.7
Cattle and Beef  7.3  16.4
Poultry and Poultry Meat  6.0  4.9
Eggs and their Derivatives  11.5  17.2
Single Products
Wheat  5.8  24.5
Barley  6.4  21.3
Corn  6.1  17.9
Soymeal  18.3  21.4
Rice  9.3  21.6
Raw Sugar  4.3  62.2
Cattle  6.2  13.5
Swine  8.1  14.4
Butter  4.3  32.3
Source:  Own  Calculation on  Basis of German Agricultural  Statistics (see  Schmitz, 1987,  p. 366)
aMeasured  as Trend-Corrected  Coefficient  of Variation Following the Approach  of Cuddy and Della
Valle,  1978, pp. 79-85.
9which is homogenous  of degree  1 in prices  and has the following properties  (Hoteling's
Lemma):
- i=  >;  0  - >;  >  -;  - >  0
ap  ap2 0v  v2
where
7r  indirect profit
p  producer prices
v  factor prices
K  quantity vector of fixed inputs
qc  output supply
XD  input demand
Using the simple mean-variance  approach of equation  (2)  and the approximation
procedure  for both moments  following Mood,  Graybill  and Boes  [1974,  p.  181,  see
equations  (19)  and  (20)], one can easily  derive  a money measure  (-  certainty  equivalent
indirect profit)  for the  expected  utility of profits leaving the variance  of input prices
unaffected  by policy:
Rev2
(4)  E [U (Or)]  7r(p,  v,  K)  +  cv2  · e  Rev-  R  *cvp2Re
7r(p, V, K)
where
p, v  mean prices
10cv  coefficient  of variation
e  supply elasticity
Rev  Revenue
R  coefficient  of relative  risk aversion
The first term on the RHS of equation (4)  is that  level of profit where prices are at their
mean.  A mean preserving  spread of producer prices, however,  creates two additional
terms  in equation (4).  The second term on the RHS  is equivalent to an increase  of the
expected  profit under fluctuating prices from which  the producer  obviously benefits,
whereas  the third term addresses the producer's  risk attitude.  A risk averse producer,
i.e., would  face  a loss of welfare under fluctuating prices.  The producer gains from pure
price  stabilization under the Common Agricultural Policy if, and only if
(5)  R>> e-
Rev
which  is likely the case  assuming plausible parameter values.
Since  the mean profit change  is  also positive,  the producers  welfare position has
been clearly improved  by the CAP.
Referring to the food insecurity status of producers under the CAP, it has  to be
stated  that the probability  (Prob) of real profit  (?r)  to fall below the critical level  (r*)  has
unequivocally been decreased  since the mean  is up and the variance  is down:
7r*  - E [7r]
(6)  Prob  F (r)  < -
N var  [7r]
11Hence,  price support  as well as price stabilization under the  CAP have  improved both
the welfare position and food security  of farmers  although  the benefits seem to be very
unevenly distributed  among different farms and regions (see  von Witzke,  1979; Tarditi
and Croci Angelini,  1982).
3.2  Consumer's  Welfare  and Food Security
Analogous to the producer  case, the  impact on consumers should be measured as
the expected utility of equivalent  income or money metric  (MM):
(7)  E[U(MM)]
Money  metric itself can be defined as that level of income needed  at some vector  of
reference  prices  (po)  in order for the consumer to attain the  same utility level he/she
enjoys from income  yo when faced with price vector  (pa).  In other words  money metric is
the sum of the initial income  (yo)  and the equivalent variation  (EV).  Since  the
equivalent variation from a pure price change  can be derived from  an expenditure
function  (e[-])  as (see  Boadway and Bruce,  1989,  p. 205):
(8)  EV  =  e (po,  u)  - e (Pl, u.).
for the  money metric it follows:
(9)  MM  =  Y  + Ae  (p, t)
where  the expenditure  function  is increasing with prices  and utility,  is homogeneous  of
degree  1 in prices,  is concave  in p,  and has the  following property (Shepard's  Lemma):
ae (p, i)
qD c (compensated  demand function)
ap
12Using again the simple mean-variance  approach of equation  (2), the Mood,  et.  al.
approximation procedure  for the mean and the variance  of the money  metric, and
rearranging some terms, yields:
(10)  E [U (MM)]  z Yo  +  i  cv2  I  EX - R cv2 EX2
where
rlc  compensated  demand elasticity  (=  r7  +  s A)
s  budget share  of products  with fluctuating  prices
l.  income elasticity
rt  (uncompensated)  demand elasticity
EX  mean expenditures  for products with fluctuating  prices
The interpretation  of equation  (10)  is analogous to that of equation  (4)  for the producer.
In accordance  with the considerations  of Helms  (1985,  pp.  93-100), the expression in (10)
could be called  the ex-ante equivalent  income.  The consumer finally gains  from pure
price stabilization if and only if:
(11)  R  >  1Cl  /s
which  is again likely to be the case  as Turnovsky,  et.  al.  (1980)  state, although the
relative gains  seem to be negligible  (Wright and Williams,  1988, pp. 616-627)  due to the
low food share in consumer's budget.  Thus,  even with equal  coefficients of risk aversion,
producers might be more heavily affected  by fluctuating  prices than consumers.
However,  the central  question of how  the CAP affects mean and variance  of
consumer prices has been left unanswered  so far.  The answer very  much depends  on the
13transmission  of price impulses  from the wholesale  to the  retail level.  Empirical  studies
show the EC consumers  to shoulder  the full burden of the price  support at the wholesale
level because  the potential for replacing  price  increasing intermediate  food or for
substituting final food consumption  is very limited  (i.e.,  Schmitz,  1987,  pp. 368-370)  and
the CAP covers nearly the whole range  of food  items.  In addition,  the  CAP contributes
little  to consumer's  price stability.  The statistically  observed  stability already  exists due
to high proportions  of stable  non-food inputs  in food value added,  to partly anticyclical
margin behavior  over  time, and to risk transferring  mechanism for which consumers  are
obviously willing to pay.  Surprisingly,  the  level of stability of final  food prices  hardly
differs among products, irrespective  of the fact  that some wholesale  prices  or producer
prices are subject of the CAP and others not (see Table  2).  Hence, the CAP has not
only weakened the welfare position of consumers but has  also increased  the level of food
insecurity.  This is in contrast to policymakers'  claims.  It holds especially  for those
consumers who spend a large portion of their budget on food, namely the older
generation,  families  with many children,  and unemployed  people.  The  low real income
of those minorities is eroded  further by the CAP.
Nevertheless,  some advocates  might  still argue  that for a vast majority of people
food security has already been provided.  That is true.  But this has not been caused  by
the food and agricultural  policy.  Rather,  it originates from the overall  performance  and
efficiency of the economy.  Thus,  it is fair to say that food  security for most people exists
despite the CAP.
14Table 2.  Variabilityb of German  Food Prices at Different  Stages  in the Food Chain  1970-1985
Price  Price
Product  Variability  (%)  Product  Variability  (%)
Swine  8.1  Cattle  6.2
Roast Pork  9.4  Roast Beef  4.2
Lard  3.1  Fillet  of Beef  4.1
Ham  2.7
Poultry  5.3
Calf  6.5  Broiled  Chicken  3.6
Veal Cutlet  8.4
Raw Milk  4.8
Eggs from Producers  6.4  Fresh Milk  4.4
Eggs Packing Incl.  5.7  Butter  4.3
Cheese  4.6
Wheat  5.8  Sugar Beets  6.9
Wheat  Flour  3.2  White  Sugar  4.3
White Bread  3.2
White  Cabbage  33.1
Rye  6.4  Cabbage  with Trade-Mark  14.0
Rye Bread  2.5  Cabbage  in Cans  4.9
Potatoes  from Producer  42.2  Red  Cabbage  42.8
Potatoes Packing Incl.  24.5  Cabbage  with Trade-Mark  15.5
Potato Salad  5.0  Cabbage  in  Cans  4.8
Potato Chips  2.4
Must  20.3
Apple from Producers  36.6  Red Wine  2.8
Apple with Trade-Mark  15.2  German Champaign  6.8
Apple Juice  7.2  Brandy  4.2
Apple-Puree  5.6
Source:  Own Calculation  on Basis of German Agricultural  Statistics (see  Schmitz, 1987,  pp. 363-364).
bMeasured as Trend-Corrected  Coefficient of Variation Following the Approach  of Cuddy and Della
Valle,  1978,  pp. 79-85.
154.  COMMON  AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND FOOD  SECURITY IN LDCs
A vast literature exists on the impact of the CAP or similar agricultural  policies of
other industrialized  countries on world markets  and on developing  countries  (i.e.,
Anderson and Tyers,  1990;  Hartmann and  Schmitz,  1991).  The focus has been on price
level induced welfare effects  in the third world.  However,  only few studies  have
addressed  the question of how to evaluate  the price transmission with respect to
variability of certain  domestic variables,  such as welfare or food  security.  A model is
developed which  allows us to analyze different  kinds of stochastic  disturbances.
Although  in an uncertain world dozens of sources  of real income  fluctuations  exist,
we will confine ourselves  to only two sources which are  claimed to be the  most important
in food  security issues:  (1)  fluctuations  in domestic  food production and  (2) external
fluctuations coming from the world market  or from developing  countries'  food
production  (Valdes,  1981, pp. 4-5).  The following  simple  stochastic  partial equilibrium
model  is used including one commodity  (i.e., grains),  two  countries  (developed country,
developing country)  and four agents  (domestic consumers  and producers,  domestic
government,  foreign export demand).  The model  is formulated  in general terms  and is
especially  useful to reveal  the  determinants  of mean  and variance  of world market prices
and their interaction with certain price transmission policies.
(12)  q5 =  f (Ps, e)  domestic  supply function of the EC
(13)  D, =  g  (PD)  domestic  demand function of the EC
(14)  qED  =  h  (Pw,  0)  export demand function of the LDC
(15)  Ps  =  k (Pw)  world price transmission concerning EC producer prices
16(16)  PD  = 1  (PW)  world price transmission  concerning  EC consumer prices
(17)  c  - qD  - qED  =  0  equilibrium condition
where
qD  =  domestic supply, demand;
qED  =  export demand;
PS,D,  = producer  price, consumer price,  world market  price;
e, 0  =  stochastic disturbance  terms related to domestic supply and export demand;
f, g, h, k, 1 =  functional  parameters
Substituting equations  (12),  (13),  (14),  (15)  and (16) into equation  (17) yields:
(18)  f [ k (P),  e]  - g [1 (P)] - h [P,, ¢]  =  0
Following  Mood, Graybill,  Boes (1983,  p.  181)  one can derive  approximations  for the
mean E[-]  and  the variance var[-]  of world  market prices from  such an implicit
stochastic equation.  Thus we have:
(19)  E [P,  (e, 0)]  Pw (E, {)  +  h var[e]  · d2/de2 Pw (a,  p)
+  ½  var[O]  · d2/dO2 *  P  (0, p)
+  cov[e,  0]  * d2/dedo  * Pw (E, F)
17(20)  var  [P~  (,  i)]  z var [e]  d  Pw  (,  d  ]
+  var [ d do  Pw  (,f  )  ]
+  2 cov [e,  d]  *[e  P  (ef  i) * do  P  (,  )]
Using the implicit function  rule for derivations  of Pw with respect  to the stochastic
disturbances e and 0 one gets:
[  fee  * DN  - fe  * fP,9  * kPw  ]
(21)  E [P,  (9,  0)]  = Pw (E, q)  +  h var [e]  *  - DN2
[  hoo  * DN  - h  * hPwo  ]
+  k var []  *  h  DN  2
f  _  fe  *  hPw.< 
+  cov [e,  ]  *  [  DN2  j
(22)  var  [Pw (e, 0)] z var [e]  *  DN 
+  var [¢]  *  [  DN  ]
fe  * ho
+  2 cov  [e, 0]  *  - DN2
where  DN  =  fPs  * kPw  - gPD  * 1P,  - hPw  >  0
fPs  =  marginal  supply response  to producer price changes
gPD  =  marginal  demand  response  to consumer  price  changes
18kPw =  marginal producer price response  to world market price  changes
lP,  =  marginal  consumer price response to world market  price changes
hPw  =  marginal  export demand response  to world market price changes
Hence,  expected  mean and variance  of world market  prices depend  on:
--  the variances of both stochastic disturbance  terms;
-- the interaction of those terms  (related, unrelated);
--  the nature of the stochastic  impact  (additive,  multiplicative);
--  various response variables  of the agents.
To illustrate  this, consider  a model which seems to be most plausible in agricultural
production.  It is characterized  by loglinear functions,  multiplicative  disturbance  terms,
and all second  derivatives  to be sufficiently small.  In that case,  one  can arrive  at:
CVe2  . q2  +  CV 0
2 qED 2 - 2 cve  * cv  * r  q  * qED
(23)  cvpw2  =
[e  Y q,  Il  +  D  +  qED  ] 2
where
e  =  supply elasticity
rl  =  demand  elasticity
o  =  export demand  elasticity
y  =  price  transmission elasticity with respect  to producer prices
P  =  price transmission  elasticity with respect  to consumer  prices
r  =  coefficient  of correlation
cv(.)  =  coefficient of variation  of the  relevant variable
19From equation  (23) one can derive  some interesting  results.  All other things being
equal, world market prices  are the more volatile, the
--  higher domestic production fluctuations;
--  higher export demand fluctuations;
--  more disturbance  terms are  negatively  correlated;
- less elastic  all responses  of private agents;
--  less world price changes  are allowed  to be transmitted  into the domestic  market.
In addition, it has to be noted that in case of multiplicative  stochastic terms even the
absolute levels of production  and export demand  matter,  to the extent that they affect
the instability  of world market  prices as weights  of the disturbance  terms.  If a country
completely insulates  its domestic market,  as the EC does, and the stochastic  disturbances
are unrelated  (r  =  0), then equation  (23)  reduces to:
cve2  . q2  +  v02 . qED2
(24)  cvP  2 =  , showing an increasing variability
12 qED 2
of world market prices compared  to open markets,  unless price  transmission elasticities
are  negative in the initial situation.  The price transmission elasticities  in equation (23)
allow to include all kinds of trade and domestic  policies  (i.e., producer  subsidies,  quotas,
stock policies,  import levies,  etc.)  and their values and signs are most important  for the
impact the EC has on the world market.
Whereas  uncertain world market prices  affect other exporting  and importing
countries' border prices  more or less equally,  the  domestic price, welfare,  and food
security effects  differ largely  depending on how LDCs transmit those fluctuations to their
20own  domestic markets, how risk averse consumers,  producers, and taxpayers are, and
how the world market price  risk interacts with other risk sources within the country.
Obviously, LDC's can generally not be considered  either  as passive actors,  completely
insulating their national economy,  or as enthusiastic adherents  of liberalized  trade.
Rather,  they react similarly to what politicians  in developed  countries  do pursuing their
individual  objectives.  Assume  a policymaker  in an LDC who seeks  to maximize  utility
from net government receipts  (GR) and foreign  exchange  earnings  (FE) (see Hammer
and Knudsen,  1990, p. 392):
(25)  U  =  U [FE, GR]  - Max.!
under the constraint:
(26)  FE  (Pd,  Pw)  - GR (Pd,  Pw)  - X  (Pd)  Pd  =  0,
where
Pd,  „  domestic and exogenous  world market  price
X  net export quantity
then the optimal level  of domestic prices  (control variable)  chosen is:
[MVFE
+  MVGR 
(27)  PdO pt =  P
[1+  *]
where
MVp,  GR  marginal  value of foreign  exchange  earnings  and net government  receipts,
respectively
o*  export supply  elasticity with  respect to domestic  prices
21(For a simultaneous  estimation of multiple price transmission  equations  of type  (27)  see
Hausner, Schmitz,  and von Witzke,  1991,  forthcoming.)
Assuming  a relative high preference  for budget receipts and an export supply
elasticity of one, implies the typical discrimination  policy against agriculture  which  is
found in most LDCs.
In order to get reasonable  price transmission elasticities  for individual countries, the
basic constrained  maximization  approach in (25)  to  (27)  has to be extended  to  consider
the dynamic nature  of policy decisions  as well  as the  cross price  effects among
commodity  markets (see Hausner,  et. al.).  Only in that case  the  welfare and food
security effects  of individual agents within  the Developing  Countries can be properly
derived.
Moreover, it  is especially worth noting that external risks  (i.e.,  world market price
risks)  do not simply disappear  even if trade policy completely isolates the domestic
market.  Although  consumers and producers  are then prevented  from facing external
price risks,  risk is nevertheless  reflected  in the government budget  in that case,  thus
throwing the burden on taxpayers.  Hence,  market insulation generally  implies simple
redistribution  of risk.  In order to  evaluate both the mean and variance  effect of prices
on welfare,  including the risk aversion component,  a group-wise  accounting  could be
used following the equations  (4)  and  (10) and  extended  by an equivalent taxpayer's  term.
(28)  , z E [U  (7r)]  +  E [U  (MM)]  +  E [U  (GR)]
w  Sum of terms of certainty  equivalent real incomes
GR  Net Government  Receipts including  the costs of the stabilization policy
22This  indicator can be used to calculate  the welfare and food security effects when world
market prices are changed with respect to both their  mean and  their variance.  The
impact  of changes  in the price variance  on agents' welfare  has been mostly neglected  in
the literature  although the price variability has proven to be very sensitive to agricultural
trade policies (Anderson and Tyers,  1990).  The EC's agricultural  and trade policy
contributes a lot of the price variability  on world  agricultural  markets and thus at least
potentially  aggravates the LDC's food security issue.  Moreover,  it increases the costs of
protecting LDC's domestic  consumers and producers  from the volatile world market and
where this is  not sufficiently  successful it might  have severe  adverse  long-term  effects  on
production and  investment  decisions  in agriculture.  Compared  to the impacts of the
EC's commodity programs  on LDCs the efforts in EC's food aid policy  (Franco,  1988)
have  only negligible positive  effects if at all.
5.  CONCLUSIONS
Although  the food security  discussion  has given more  emphasis  on the individual
(household)  level as the proper unit of analysis,  it still suffers  from applying
inappropriate  indicators, which  are  mostly quantity oriented, instead of relying on more
recent  results of the literature that it is purchasing  power or real  income that matters.  In
addition,  it has not been made clear  so far how food security corresponds  to the welfare
status of agents.  Since  food security  can more or less  be associated with  an uncertain
world this should at least be reflected  in the value function of individuals who are
generally  risk averse.
23Therefore,  it is proposed in the paper that the  measurement  of both food security
and welfare should be based on the probability  distribution of adjusted  real household
income  over time on a daily basis.  Food security can then be defined  as the probability
of any agent's real  income exceeding  a critical level, whereas  the welfare status  is
measured as the agent's expected  utility of this real income.  Special formulas  are
developed  in this context  [equations  (4)  and (10)]  which allows  one to calculate
producer's and consumer's welfare  under price uncertainty  and risk aversion separating
the risk response  effect as  well as the  mean  income moving effect of price fluctuations.
All these indicators  should be used when  comparing and evaluating  food  security or  food
insecurity of any agent in whatever region.
Applying this concept to  the paper's question  of how  the EC contributes  to food
security one can conclude that
--  EC-producers  are  affected directly by higher  and stabilized  producer prices
inducing an improved welfare  and food security position  of the small group of
farm households;
--  EC-consumers,  as a large group,  suffer from EC's price policy in welfare  and food
security terms because the price increasing effect  is fully transmitted  from the
wholesale  to the retail level  and stable  consumer prices  for food occur even
without any producer price stabilization;
--  the CAP with  its strongly isolating  character  (low price transmission  elasticities)
has decreased  and destabilized  world  market prices  of agricultural  commodities
eroding at least potentially the  most important source of real  income earnings  in
24LDCs, namely agricultural production;
--  the CAP-induced  negative  income  and food security effects  for producers  have
been even aggravated  by  the fact that most  LDCs apply sector-specific  and
macroeconomic  policies  which, in addition, heavily  discriminate against
agriculture  and severely  endangers the  access  to enough and healthy food;
--  the potential welfare  and food security  gains of price level  reductions  for
consuming  and for importing agents  are probably compensated  by increasing price
and  income risks.
However,  the real effect of the  CAP on individual  domestic agents  in LDCs very
much  depend on how the distorted  probability distribution of world  market prices is
transmitted  into the country and  how this affects agent's real  income  probability
distribution.  Also in that context the paper stresses the importance  of the nature  of
price transmission  and a brief indication  is given on how to derive  multiple price
transmission equations  empirically based  on a theoretically  reasonable  optimization
behavior.  The knowledge  of vertical, interregional  and intertemporal  price  transmission
seems to be crucial for the analysis of food security  issues.
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